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Abstract  
 
This paper uses the last few decades’ developments in the area of shared parenting to explore 
power within the framework of autopoietic theory.  It traces how, prompted by turbulence 
from the political subsystem, family law has made several unsuccessful attempts to solve the 
perceived problem of post-separation dual-household parenting.  It agrees with Luhmann and 
Teubner that closed autopoietic systems’ developments are limited by their normative and 
cognitive frameworks, and also argues that changes, which have occurred in family law, show 
that closed social systems do not function in total isolation.  It considers power as ego’s ability 
to limit alter’s choices.  In our functionally differentiated society, with its recent proliferation of 
communication, power appears more diffuse and impossible to plot into causal one-way 
relationships. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The topic of shared parenting has, in the last few decades, moved up the political agenda.  
There have been a number of changes in the law, as the legal system has perceived itself to be 
under pressure from politics to find a solution to the problems of family breakdown.  Yet, 
autopoietic theory provides an explanation why current reforms are likely to prove no more 
effective than previous ones.  Normative messages generated within one system about the 
desirability of a particular form of shared parenting are very imperfectly ‘translated’ (in reality 
recreated) within a receptor system.  Acceptance and rejection depend on the latter’s existing 
normative and cognitive framework: what the system or person can understand and process 
and what they want to hear.   
 
A carefully crafted and comprehensive new blueprint for the organisation of post-divorce family 
life was set out in The Children Act 1989 (van Krieken, 2005, p. 33).   Since then, the courts 
have used its orders, notably Parental Responsibility (PR) and Shared Residence Orders 
(SROs), in ways that had not been envisaged by the Act’s draftsmen: away from solely 
regulating practicalities toward the making of symbolic statements (Harris & George 2010).  As 
was the case with the 1989 Act, the objective has been to encourage shared parenting after 
separation.  Cautious messages generated within scientific disciplines about the benefits of 
cooperative parenting have been partially and often erroneously recreated within politics, and 
3 
 
then within law, to create simplistic exhortations about the need to involve both parents in 
post-separation parenting.  Nevertheless, parents continue to bring these disputes to court and 
dissatisfaction with the family justice system has persisted; separated fatherhood has come to be 
understood as a political problem that requires a legal solution (Collier & Sheldon, 2008).     
 
Although both law and politics are perceived as comparatively powerful, changes to the law 
have proved ineffective or counterproductive.  New reforms have now been introduced in the 
Children and Families Act 2014.  Autopoietc theory explains why this will be a triumph of 
hope over experience; parents may be unable to understand what the law asks of them or 
unwilling to adjust because what they are being told is incompatible with what they already 
understand to be good or bad parenting.   
 
In this context, the question of power becomes interesting.  Power can be observed as a process 
of applying pressure, limiting choices and achieving results.  However, this is too simplistic: it 
can rest with more than one system, can flow in more than one direction, and can be perceived 
very differently within different systems.  In relation to the accommodation of power within 
the framework of autopoietic theory, this paper is more an invitation to discussion than a 
presentation of a definitive account.      
 
This article commences with a brief consideration of aspects of autopoietic theory, before 
looking at power as a generalised communication medium.  It then picks up those themes as it 
details the changes to the law that have been made to encourage shared parenting.  It agrees 
with Luhmann that “[b]eing aware of these fundamental problems of self-observation and self-
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description of the societal system does not lead to resignation; on the contrary, it is a 
prerequisite to any realistic approach” (Luhmann 1990, p. 101).  
 
2 Closure in Autopoietic Theory  
 
There are particular aspects of autopoietic theory that challenge the reader.  One is the fact 
that social systems are made up of communications, rather than people.  Law, or the legal 
subsystem, is not defined as a network of rules or the activities of those who apply and 
interpret legal rules, but as all communications that use the code legal/illegal to communicate 
about the law (Luhmann, 1995, p. 286). Communications are the basic units that build the 
system as they are linked together in circular chains that link past and future communications.  
Individuals are described as psychic autopoietic systems.  Their basic units, a person’s thoughts 
and “the meanings unique to each individual” remain inaccessible to other systems; there is no 
perfect symmetry between what a person wants to say, and how that is understood and 
communicated about within social subsystems such as law. (Teubner, Nobles & Schiff, 2003, p. 
917).  The system is not only greater than the sum of its parts; it is something altogether 
different.   
 
Another controversial aspect of autopoietic theory is closure; just as a cell reproduces itself 
from its own elements and according to its existing blueprint, social subsystems are re-created 
exclusively by use of their existing communications (Luhmann, 1992, p. 1422).  Society is 
composed of a number of disparate, closed subsystems (and subsystems within subsystems), 
which have developed as society has become more complex and functionally differentiated.  
These subsystems are not static, but continually recreate themselves by making new distinctions 
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between subsystem and environment and between what is or is not relevant.  Legal 
communications are linked together in two different cycles, which developed consecutively.  
The first is at the level of operations, communications about what law is doing.   The second-
order “hypercycle” consists of communications which observe, evaluate and regulate the 
subsystem.  It insulates law from external pressures, allowing the legal subsystem to self-generate 
its identity undisturbed (Teubner, 1993, p. 33).  Thus, circularity guarantees autonomy (ibid, p. 
75). According to Teubner, theorists in jurisprudence had needlessly struggled with the 
inherent circularity in their accounts of law, erroneously seeing this as a weakness in their 
theoretical model rather than an inescapable feature of law (ibid, p .9).  Only the law decides 
what it lawful, and it does this only by referring to its own, previous communications (Teubner, 
Nobles & Schiff, 2003, p. 905).  There is no privileged position of observation, metanarrative 
or Grundnorm (Luhmann, 1992, p. 1428).    
 
The assertion that law is closed off from other systems appears to be contradicted by 
observation.  Legislation requires law to import a variety of political, economic or social values, 
while law’s role as arbiter of disputes requires it to acknowledge external information and 
communicate its normative pronouncements to the outside world (Smith, 2004, p. 334).  
However, what looks superficially like law importing terminology from politics, economics or 
elsewhere, is in fact one subsystem using the meaning-making materials of another “to 
reformulate something new in its own internal context” (Teubner, Nobles & Schiff, 2003, p. 
916).  This has been termed re-entry.  Rather than law actually admitting new material from the 
environment into itself, legal communications create an internal version of the environment, 
misunderstood according to law’s preconceptions and limitations.  Law has its own idea of 
what politics or economics are about, but no direct access to those subsystems, and vice versa.  
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Law does not actually solve problems in its environment (or, if you like, in the real world); it is 
only within its internally reconstructed version of reality (created through the process of re-
entry) that problems appear to be solved.    
 
Where an event, such as the passing of an Act of Parliament, is communicated about in two or 
more subsystems, this can create an illusion of compatibility.  However, even where the same 
words are used, their meanings differ between subsystems, as do the criteria used to judge 
success or failure.  The communications about the event are “not only analytically but 
empirically distinct from each other” (Teubner, 1998, p. 27).  This is termed structural 
coupling (Teubner, 1998, p. 27).  Similarly the making of an order in a contact/residence 
dispute will take on different meanings for the legal subsystem and the individual litigants.   
Structural coupling does not allow a straightforward transfer of information, but it can create 
turbulence which forces subsystems to adjust, particularly if turbulence is perceived to be 
coming from a more powerful subsystem.     
 
As mentioned in the introduction, closed subsystems are built around obfuscated tautologies 
or paradoxes. Law determines what is lawful based on criteria it has designed: “it is legal, 
because it is legal” is the tautologous paradox at the heart of law (Teubner, Nobles & Schiff, 
2003, p. 919).   Modern law, which has become highly politicised due to “intense structural 
coupling” with politics and economics, is vulnerable to demands for some “fundamental fact or 
value” to underpin the legal/illegal distinctions (ibid, p. 909, p. 919).  However, as Luhmann 
has observed, such a value cannot be provided: “[t]here are paradoxes everywhere, wherever we 
look for foundations” (Luhmann, 1988, p. 154).  They cannot be eliminated, only hidden in 
order to be ignored (ibid, p. 161).   
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One way for subsystems to obfuscate tautologies and paradoxes is through the making of 
further distinctions, e.g. between the creation of new law through (political) legislation and the 
(neutral) administration of justice.  Thus, the structural coupling that occurs when new 
legislation is enacted is usefully employed by both the legal and political subsystems to explain 
away the paradoxes at the heart of the subsystems (Luhmann, 1988, p. 160).   
 
Closed subsystems, which evaluate themselves through second-order cycles of self-evaluation, 
develop their own understandings of what they are, and of what role they fulfil in society.1   
Luhmann has observed that whereas self-descriptions based on paradoxical approaches (the 
system should be what it isn’t) make for progressive, “if not revolutionary” self-descriptions 
(and systems), descriptions based on the tautological (the system is what it is) result in systems 
which understand themselves to be rather conservative (Luhmann 1990, p. 127).  This is the 
case of law.  It explains law’s continued loyalty to traditional, gendered understandings of 
family.  Furthermore,  “[i]f society is supposed to be what it is, then the solution can only be to 
conserve society, to continue to solve its problems, and possibly to improve problem solving 
and to overcome unexpected difficulties” (Luhmann 1990, pp. 127-128).   This is a very apt 
description of how family law has dealt with the problem of demographic change and post-
separation parenting (but not how this ‘problem’ has been understood elsewhere, for instance 
by parents).   
 
3 Power  
 
                                                     
1  On the basis of their own understandings of their environment as generated through re-entry. 
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In his 1979 book Power, Luhmann saw power particularly in terms of limiting choices.  Whilst 
power is rooted in the physical reality of force, social systems are not concerned with actual 
power, only with their own internal understandings of power.  It therefore makes more sense, 
it is submitted, to discuss perceptions of power, and how messages about these are included in 
communications.    This is, indeed, largely the focus of Power.2  This paper, too, is 
predominantly concerned with perceptions of power.  Since systems are closed and cannot 
really directly force changes in their environments, what matters is less what systems can 
actually achieve than what is considered possible through communications involving power.  
That said, since the paper is concerned with interactions between systems, there are some 
observations on power per se, albeit as perceived and discussed within autopoietic theory.   
 
Luhmann, drawing on Parsons, categorised power as a “symbolically generalized 
communication medium” (1979, p. 108).  These media (other examples include money, truth 
and love) are “mechanism[s] additional to language” (ibid, p. 111) which facilitate 
communications by reducing both contingency and complexity.  In modern, functionally 
differentiated societies, abstract power codes have developed which bring speed, efficiency, 
predictability.  A communication is accompanied by a “meta-communication” about power 
(Luhmann 1979, p. 124).  Alter can be expected, to a greater extent, to accept ego’s 
recommended solutions (ibid, p. 116).  Its relatively abstract nature makes it easier for power to 
‘travel’ across system boundaries in the sense that perceptions of power can be recreated with 
comparative ease within a second system on the basis of its observations of the first system (ibid, 
p. 171).  
                                                     
2  However, a problem with relying solely on Luhmann’s account of power in Power when exploring the role of power 
in autopoietic systems is that this comparatively early book makes frequent references to power holders as 
individual participants; although society as a system is mentioned it is not clear that society is not designed and 
driven by people but a system of communications.   
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Law’s role is to impose order and it resists challenges which are likely to cause further conflicts 
(Luhmann, 1989, p. 144).   Complex and diverse disputes are reduced to generalisations or 
repetitions, which mask tensions and create an impression of internal consistency (Teubner, 
1993, p. 57).   A legal norm cannot be allowed to lose its validity “just because someone 
infringes it” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 296).  A speed limit, for example, is not increased because 
many motorists exceed it.  Law is cognitively open (it ‘admits’ or recreates information) but 
normatively closed (new information does not generally cause law to adjust its standards).  Law 
is what it is. This counterfactual stability creates an impression that law is powerful, since it can 
choose to refuse to adjust.   It can be argued that to some extent law becomes powerful if it is 
perceived to be powerful, since others will more readily limit their choices in response to legal 
communications.   
 
Luhmann acknowledged the difficulties inherent in explaining power in a way that is both 
theoretically and empirically satisfactory (1979, p. 107).  His account of power answers some 
questions, but raises others.  If power is not exclusively force (and that is too simplistic a 
description for a complex society) then what is it?  Should it be defined in the narrow sense of 
political power, or the widest sense as anything alter can use to influence ego’s selections: we 
could say that alter has power over ego? However, both these definitions seem inconsistent with 
Luhmann’s discussions in Power; it is made clear that power can be both illegal and informal 
(ibid, p. 134) and that other symbolically generalized communication media, for example love, 
can also be used to influence choices (ibid, p. 175).  What is clear, and helpful, is that power is 
not force or coercion (zwang): it decreases, rather than increases, when threats have to be 
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carried out (ibid, p. 121).  Nor is it a zero-sum game: power in a society increases as complexity 
increases and there are more contingencies to regulate (ibid, p. 146).   
 
It is important to recognise, however, that whilst power limits choices, it cannot guarantee 
outcomes (Luhmann 1979, p. 114).  As is often stressed within autopoietic theory, there is no 
simplistic relationship between cause and effect.  Power can be multidimensional and 
multidirectional, and it also includes the power to thwart or avoid decisions (ibid, p. 163).   
These observations are confirmed by a closer examination of the relationships between politics, 
law, and particularly individual litigant parents.   
 
The aim of this paper is not to provide a comprehensive taxonomy, and may raise more 
questions than it answers, thus stimulating further discussion.  It must be acknowledged that 
there is no privileged, neutral vantage point outside of systems that can be used to ascertain the 
actual operation of power.  All that can be offered are observations from one perspective; most 
of these are concerned with perceptions of power, but some discuss how power can be seen and 
described within autopoietic theory.     
 
4 Family Law: The Children Act 1989  
 
If law generally appears powerful because it can refuse to adjust in the face of disappointed 
expectations, then a clear exception is law’s relationship with politics; law has to respond to 
and implement new legislation.  Luhmann has observed that the political system, as part of its 
environment, has a particular impact on the legal system (Luhmann 1990, p. 229).  The 
paradox that only law can say what is lawful is hidden by references to the political system; a 
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crucial part of the system’s strategy to portray its self-determinations as “natural, necessary, and 
lacking functional alternatives.” (Luhmann 1990, p. 139).   Furthermore, in family law as in 
other areas, an increasing amount of new law now comes in the form of legislation as politics 
presents law with new problems to solve (Luhmann 1990, p. 235).  In this sense, politics seems 
more powerful than law, since in the face of turbulence from the former, the latter cannot 
choose to do nothing. Political power, according to Luhmann, does not have to be “created 
anew” within law, it is enough “that it exists somewhere and can be called upon” (1979, p. 
171). 
 
The Children Act 1989 illustrates, however, that what politics seeks to communicate to law will 
not be straightforwardly recreated within the legal subsystem since the process depends on 
law’s existing normative framework.  Power is not enough; while politics limits law’s choices 
due the latter’s perception of the former as more powerful, a number of other factors are also 
involved: law’s reading of the situation as coloured by its internal normative framework, law’s 
resistance to change where it is perceived to be too costly or where it seems incompatible with 
current aims, and law’s reliance on its own cognitive framework to understand what is being 
said.  In this way, power is limited: alter can influence, but never straightforwardly dictate, ego’s 
choices.     
 
The legal subsystem’s understanding of the 1989 Act was determined by how it ‘saw’ the world, 
just as individuals’ conceptions of reality are coloured by their earlier experiences.  The 
draftsmen behind the Act sought only to help parents make arrangements to share the care of 
their children in ways that suited them, and were not concerned with gender relations or social 
change.  This was not, however, how the Act’s regulatory framework came to be understood 
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within law.  Feminist scholars have long criticised family law for its preoccupation with 
perpetuating hierarchical nuclear family structures (Rifkin 1980, p. 83; DuBois et al 1985, p. 
13).  To assert this is not incompatible with autopoietic theory since a patriarchal framework of 
reference was part of law’s normative make-up when it initially closed itself off from society 
through functional differentiation.  Law, like autopoietic systems in general, demands binaries: 
legal/not legal, public/private, male/female, and the private or female has been left 
unregulated and invisible without this being viewed as problematic since this patriarchal view 
has become habitual, a part of the subsystem’s identity. This has traditionally turned attention 
away from caring and other activities that occur within the supposedly private sphere.  
Mothering has been largely ignored, implicitly understood as a selfless, natural outpouring of 
love that can be taken for granted (Lawler, 1999, p. 67).   
 
Commentators around the time of the enactment of the Children Act 1989 observed that the 
increased prevalence of divorce, single parenthood and unmarried cohabitation had exposed 
the fragility of the nuclear family paradigm (Roche, 1991, p. 349).  This was presented in 
political communications as a problem law ought to address (Murray, 1996).  In response, law 
sought to contain the anxieties surrounding this demographic change by reconstructing 
parenthood to replace marriage as the primary relationship with the “reassuring irrevocable 
permanence”, which can endure “unaffected by the vicissitudes of adult life” and thus have a 
stabilising influence on individuals, families and society (Roche, 1991, p. 349).    Reasons why 
this did not work will be examined below.   
 
5 Law and Child Welfare Experts  
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External information does not only affect family law through legislation.  Although law is 
normatively closed, it “can and must” be cognitively open “where fact-finding is concerned” 
(Luhmann, 1995, p. 296).   Disputes between parents about who should care for their children 
are decided according to the welfare principle, contained in s1(1) of the Children Act 1989, 
which has been interpreted in case law as stipulating that the child’s welfare must be the court’s 
first and only consideration.3 A welfare checklist of factors to consider is contained in s1(3), 
but it is non-exhaustive and non-hierarchical and not intended to fetter judicial discretion.  
Choosing the ‘best’ solution means law is forced to abandon its usual retrospective approach 
and attempt to predict the future.  Thus, decisions must, to a large extent, be based on external 
expertise on what harms or helps children (Smith, 2004, p. 319).    However, “the reliability of 
any area of knowledge is always open to the court’s critical scrutiny, and what any expert is 
actually expert in is a matter for the court to decide”. (van Krieken, 2006, p. 576).  
Furthermore, information has to be presented in legal code.  As Lord Hoffman explained in Re 
B, law needs to convert possibilities into certainties; “there is no room for a finding that 
[something] might have happened”.4  Ryder LJ is quite correct to have commented, extra-
judicially, that this approach to findings of fact is “legal fiction” (Ryder, 2008, p. 30). Indeed, 
Lord Hoffman’s observations fit well with Teubner’s assertion that regardless of pressure from 
external sources or even internal aspirations, law can only recreate knowledge using its own 
cognitive framework and its own language (2001, p. 24).   
 
King and Piper have examined family law from an autopoietic perspective, confirming that 
what superficially appears to be the wholesale importation of information is, instead, a 
                                                     
3  J v C [1970] AC 668.   This could be thought to conflict with a human rights approach which requires 
consideration of all parties’ rights and interests, but the paramountcy principle’s compatibility has been confirmed 
both by domestic courts, e.g. in Re B (A Minor) [2001] UKHL 70 and by the European Court of Human Rights in 
Yousef v Netherlands [2003] 1 FLR.   
4  Re B [2008] UKHL 35 per Lord Hoffman at [2].   
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recreation of modified versions of that knowledge within law (1995).  They assert that a 
separate autopoietic subsystem has developed, which they label child welfare science.  Initially 
an amalgam of predictions from medicine, psychology, psychiatry and social work about what is 
good for children, it has developed its own discursive identity, with its own meaning-making 
procedures and personnel, and with a binary code of “bad for children” or “good for children” 
(King & Piper, 1995, p. 43).   As Rejmer has noted, this system, too, appears increasingly self-
referential and self-reinforcing (2003, pp. 83-84).  It is, however, a system that perceives itself to 
be less powerful than law, possibly because it prioritises cognitive openness, while law’s stress 
on normative closure means it is typically described as “unyielding, internally cumbersome and 
resistant to change” (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2003, p. 5).  
 
The participants in this new discourse are well-versed in structuring their communications to 
suit the legal subsystem.  Researchers using autopoietic theory found that when social workers 
were presenting children’s wishes and feelings to the courts, the latters’ views were 
reinterpreted through the dual filters of child welfare science and family law, into a “legalistic 
code” which was thought easier for courts to use (James et al, 2004, p. 193; Rejmer, 2003, p. 
188).   
 
This reinterpretation to suit law (at the expense of the powerless children who are supposed to 
be the courts’ paramount concern) is a good example of how individuals can participate within 
several subsystems, modifying their communications accordingly, but are “severely 
constrained”; if they choose to communicate, and want to do so successfully, they must do so 
on the terms dictated by the subsystem (Schiff & Nobles, 2009, p. 30).  All communications 
must take for granted a level of prior shared understanding, which sets the parameters for what 
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can be communicated (Luhmann 1979, p. 142).  If social workers giving evidence wish to have 
their communications accepted within law they must, like lawyers and judges, speak and write 
as if they broadly agree with existing legal standards (for example on what is good for children), 
and in a way likely to be understood by law (Schiff & Nobles, 2009, p. 33).  It is submitted here 
that if law is perceived to be comparatively powerful within other social subsystems, and by 
individual psychic systems, choices will be made to speak law’s language as a means to an end, 
and law’s comparatively unchanging nature will reinforce the perception of it as powerful.5    
 
Conseqeuntly, law has enslaved child welfare science information to create “a selective and 
simplified version of welfare” (Kaganas & Piper, 2002, p. 377).  This has, further, been 
coloured by law’s blindness to the private, domestic or feminine, and its inability to value 
mothering.  Thus, psychiatry’s “fluid predictions”, for example, have become 
“oversimplifications” (Clarkson & Clarkson, 2007, p. 267). “Law’s operations are smoother”, 
according to Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, “when noise has been previously masticated into 
potential order” (2003, p. 25).   Law’s preference for the abstract and generalised has moved 
family law from the observation that a good relationship with a father is very important to 
some children to the assertion that all children need relationships with their fathers.6  
 
The 1990s de facto presumption in favour of contact meant that risks of harm associated with 
addiction, psychiatric illness, domestic violence and even allegations of child abuse were 
incorrectly held to be outweighed by the supposed natural benefits of contact with the child’s 
                                                     
5  Parents, too, are likely to see law as powerful, due to its close association with political power and its enforcement 
messages.  Nevertheless, as will be explored below, this does not guarantee results.   
6  See e.g. Adam J quoted by Sir Mark Potter P in Re A [2008] EWCA Civ 867 at [35].  Mothering, however, remains 
invisible to law and largely taken for granted.  There is, therefore, no perceived need to support or encourage it in 
these cases.   
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father; 7 this judicial optimism also meant courts failed to address the problems posed by 
inexperienced, incompetent or untrustworthy applicants. (Barnett, 2009, p. 139).   The fact 
that the pendulum had swung too far in favour of contact was eventually acknowledged by the 
Court of Appeal in Re L, V, M, H [2000].8   
 
Yet, as acknowledged by Thorpe LJ in that case, a general “assumption” in favour of contact 
remains.9  In Re P [2008] Ward LJ remarked that there could be “no doubt of the secure 
foundation for the assumption that contact benefits children”.10  As Gilmore has convincingly 
demonstrated, no such firm foundation can be found in the child welfare sciences (Gilmore, 
2008, p. 1227).  Law, however, sees itself as sufficiently powerful to ignore this; it decides how 
to resolve contact cases, and chooses to do so by referring predominantly to its own internal 
communications.   
 
However, the new legal framework of the 1989 Act and the judicial pro-contact stance 
entrenched through comments in a number of judgments failed to ‘solve’ the problems of 
separated parenthood and dissatisfied fathers.11  Imperfectly translated normative expectations 
that are imperfectly communicated from politics to law to individual parents could not be 
expected to ‘fix’ the problem of these disputes.   
 
In the Children Act 1989, custody and access had been replaced with parental responsibility 
(PR), residence and contact to “lower the stakes” and avoid creating winners and losers (Law 
                                                     
7 See e.g. H v H [1989] 1 FLR 212; Re P [1996] 2 FLR 314; Re H [1998] 2 FLR 42. 
8  Re L, V, M, H [2001] Fam 260.  
9  Ibid, per Thorpe LJ pp. 294-295.  
10  Re P [2008] EWCA Civ 1431 per Ward LJ at [38].   
11  Contact and residence cases usually have a history of bitterness, and achieving lasting agreement is particularly 
difficult, since arrangements must be implemented over the long-term and often renegotiated in response to 
changes in circumstances.    
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Commission, 1986, para 7.18).12   Residence was to answer the practical question of where the 
child was to live, while PR was introduced in s3(1) to deal with “all the rights, duties, powers, 
responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of a child has...13  This was designed to 
allow the non-resident parent to retain equal status with the primary carer and provide an 
incentive for continued involvement with the child (Law Commission, 1988, para 4.5).  Court 
statistics and media coverage for the twenty years after the Act’s implementation showed, 
however,   that increasing numbers of parents were turning to court, and that contact disputes, 
in particular, remained a controversial topic.14 Fathers’ groups complained that contact orders 
were not enforced sufficiently robustly, and that PR, designed to mirror practical involvement, 
was now given to almost all fathers but had consequently become little more than a symbolic 
signifier of the formal status of fatherhood (Reece, 2009; Harris & George 2010).   
 
Observing the dynamic between the individual fathers who make up these groups and the 
political and legal subsystems leads to the suggestion that power relationships, like the chains of 
communications within closed subsystems, are circular in nature.   As Luhmann observed, 
there are flows and counterflows of power (Luhmann 1979, p. 163).  Communications by 
fathers’ groups created turbulence that was heard by politics and resulted in communications 
                                                     
12  Law Commission (1986) Family Law Review of Child Law: Custody, Working Paper No 96, London, HMSO, [7.18]; 
Department of Health (1991) The Children Act 1989: Guidance and Regulations, Vol 1, Court Orders, London, HMSO, 
[2.25]. 
13  Under Sections 2 and 4 of the Children Act 1989, PR is acquired by mothers, married fathers, and all fathers who 
register the birth of the child.  It signals that parenting roles continue post separation.  PR can only be lost by 
adoption or by unmarried fathers; the latter has only happened once in five years in Re D (A Child) [2014] EWCA 
Civ 315.   
14  For court statistics on the steady increase in these cases, see e.g. Judicial and Court Statistics 2006, p. 85, available 
at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/243134/7273.pdf  and 
Judicial and Court Statistics 2011, p21, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/217494/judicial-court-stats-
2011.pdf last accessed 18th September 2014.  For media coverage see e.g. Ross, T (2012, July 25) Father’s rights 
breached by mother 'too upset’ to let him see children, The Telegraph, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/9424060/Fathers-rights-breached-by-mother-too-upset-to-
let-him-see-children.html last accessed 18th September 2014.   
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within the latter subsystem.15  Particularly successful was the publicity-seeking group 
Fathers4Justice, led by former Marketing Consultant Matt O’Connor.  He has been quoted as 
saying: "...if you can catapult stuff into the headlines, good or bad, then you've created 
something that gets ingrained in the public consciousness as a brand”.16  Politicians’ concerns 
that this view of family law as ‘failing’ was increasingly shared by voters (perceived as collectively 
powerful as they select governments), led to further pressure on law to solve the supposed 
problems of biased, secretive or inefficient courts that fail to enforce contact and secure men’s 
ties to (and control over) their children within new binuclear post-separation families (Collier 
& Sheldon, 2008; Kaganas, 2013). Politics sees itself as able to influence voters’ choices, but 
simultaneously has to acknowledge that power does rest with the latter, too.  Thus, different 
systems can be perceived to have different kinds of power at the same time; power is 
multidimensional.  It does not rest in only one place, nor can it be mapped into fixed 
hierarchies, but it is to a large extent situational.   
 
As a result of this turbulence from politics, family law enslaved another discourse, that of 
mediation, and the legal understanding of the SRO changed away from the regulation of 
practicalities towards the sending of symbolic messages.   
 
6 Law’s Enslavement of Mediation Discourse  
 
                                                     
15  There are other stakeholders, notably those representing mothers and children, who have criticised the system for 
the opposite reasons; that courts are far too ready to order contact with violent and dangerous men.  However, 
these communications have not had the same success in terms of being heard.  This is perhaps because law 
observes its environment through an inherent, patriarchal lens, and because concerns raised on behalf of these 
groups do not resonate as well with political anxieties about fatherlessness, delinquency and loss of societal 
cohesion.  See Smart (1995).  
16  D, Ross, “Matt O’Connor, the Man behind Fathers4Justice”, The Independent, 4th July 2006. Available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/matt-oconnor-the-man-behind-fathers4justice-406610.html 
last accessed 1st February 2014.   
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In 1995, King and Piper, writing from an autopoietic perspective, were understandably 
pessimistic about family law’s capacity for fundamental change (p. 29).  They contrasted the 
traditional legal retrospective and adversarial approach with the “welfarist” approach as typified 
by mediation, where compromise is encouraged by drawing attention away from allegations of 
past wrongdoings and constructing a narrative where both parents have the will and capacity to 
be responsible and sensible (ibid, p. 91, p. 94).  Anyone interested in family law reading these 
comments would be struck by the changes that have, indeed, occurred since this was written: 
the latter description is now more accurate for family law.   
 
These changes confirm the assertion that, although change within an autopoietic system is slow 
and largely unplottable, it does occur.  At times, changes of self-description become necessary.  
As Luhmann has asserted, self-descriptions have important systemic functions; but if they 
become too costly in terms of the apparent lack of fit between tradition and reality, they must 
be jettisoned (1990, pp. 123-124).  The traditional legal approach could not solve most contact 
disputes; parents were not only coming to court, but were also returning to court again (and 
again) when orders were breached, while fathers’ groups’ protests created an impression of 
widespread dissatisfaction with the family justice system. A different approach was needed to 
create the impression that these conflicts were being solved and that families in flux were being 
stabilised into new binuclear families.   Thus, the terminology used by mediators and child 
psychologists has replaced the adversarial legal language of blame and fault (James, 2003, p. 
137).   There has been a significant shift in normative expectations. Litigating spouses/parents 
are encouraged to reach their own agreements by their lawyers, by the Children and Family 
Court Advisory and Support Service (Cafcass) at in-court conciliation, and by judges who order 
mediation or Separated Parents Information Programmes (Smith & Trinder, 2012).   
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This does not, however, contradict the statement that there can be no “shared normativity” 
(Teubner, 1993, p. 65); what has been incorporated is the legal system’s own version of 
mediation-within-law (King & Piper, 1995, p. 59).  As mediation has been accommodated into 
the legal framework, the focus has been narrowed to agreement on the immediate issues rather 
than long term resolution of conflicts. Mediation is often considered to be working well; but 
success is assessed solely in terms of quantity rather than the quality of the agreements reached 
(Ryrstedt, 2009, p. 821; Rejmer, 2003, p. 118).  Mediation has been subordinated to, or fitted 
into, law, rather than the opposite occurring.  According to Teubner, the closure of autopoietic 
systems does not render the issue of power irrelevant (1993, p. 79).  The extent to which one 
social subsystem can enslave another depends on subsystems’ internal perceptions of other 
systems’ relative power and authority (ibid, p. 103).  In the English courts, the focus has 
narrowed to agreement on the immediate issue of contact rather than the quality of agreements 
and the long term resolution of conflicts (Smith & Trinder, 2012, p. 432).  Although the same 
terminology is used, words have slightly different meanings, and the objectives adjusted to suit 
law’s purposes.   
 
Law’s focus on how things should be rather than how they are means that mediation’s ideal has 
become law’s new standard. Already by the late 1990s, researchers looking at legal 
communications found a binary divide between the ‘good’, forward-looking conciliatory 
divorce and the ‘bad’ adversarial one, noting that these classifications were “becom[ing] 
entrenched through the cumulative effect of self-reinforcing professional received wisdom” 
(Bailey-Harris et al, 1999, p. 122).  Thus, if a responsible parent always puts the child first, 
recognising the child’s paramount need to know the other parent, and conflict per se is 
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constructed as harmful, then parents who resist contact are prima facie in the wrong, 
irresponsible and unreasonable.  “Compromise”, according to Wall LJ, “is an art that every 
separated parent ought to master”.17   Since law sees itself as a system that is to be obeyed (and 
thus a comparatively powerful system), judicial ‘lectures’ to parents regarding the harmful 
effects of conflict are becoming commonplace.18  In Re R [2009], Wall LJ read the first four 
lines of Philip Larkin's poem This be the Verse and cautioned the parents that unless they could 
protect their son from their fighting they might well lose him.19 This is a threat oft-repeated by 
judges but rarely carried out. Its effectiveness lies in persuading mothers to allow fathers access 
to their children. As Luhmann asserted, power is diminished, not increased, with the actual 
use of coercive threats. “Part of the communication of power”, according to Luhmann, “is that 
the power-possessor would rather not realize his avoidance alternative but is prepared to do so” 
(1979, p. 139).   
 
A final point in relation to law’s enslavement of mediation is that law’s expectations remain 
gendered, mothering continues to be constructed as natural and self-sacrificing, and therefore 
invisible because it can be taken for granted.  It is primarily mothers who are to be persuaded 
of the need to collaborate with fathers, not vice versa (Kaganas, 2013, p. 281).  Mediation’s 
understandings of the ‘good’ post-separation family have been recreated within law subject to 
the latter’s pre-existing patriarchal understanding of families.  The law’s lack of interest in 
mothering, and in encouraging mothers, can make them seem powerless. However, different 
systems can take contradictory positions on the allocations of power.  The fathers’ rights 
movement would assert the contrary: that mothers are too powerful.  As will be explored in 
                                                     
17  Re G [2008] EWCA Civ 1468 at [7]. 
18  See e.g. Re J [2004] EWCA Civ 1188 per Wall LJ at [5-6]; Re T [2009] EWCA Civ 20 per Wall LJ at [66].   
19  Re R [2009] EWCA Civ 358 at [124], [128]. 
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Section 9, political communications from government suggest that this view of mothers as 
selfish wielders of power has influenced recent law reform.  These differing perceptions of who 
is powerful add another level of complexity to any attempt to define power.   
 
7 The changing Shared Residence Case law  
 
When parents are expected to reach their own agreements, the attraction of a shared residence 
order (SRO) is its superficial fairness: if you divide children’s time in half then both parents are 
equal, and they have nothing left to fight over.20  At the same time, this solution is compatible 
with the new paradigm of the binuclear family. 
 
There is no firm definition of shared residence.  The Children Act 1989 states in s11(4) that a 
residence order “may specify the periods during which the child is to live in the different 
households concerned”  but there is no stipulation as to time.  The distinction between shared 
residence and sole residence with generous overnight contact is essentially a question of 
degree.21   
 
Initially, courts adhered to the original Children Act understanding of shared residence.  
Residence orders were, “as their words indicate, practical orders”.22  However, an alternative 
line of cases developed where shared residences orders were made, it seemed, primarily to ease 
former primary carers’ sense of loss, and thus avoid a deterioration of relationships.23  
                                                     
20 This type of argument was aired inter alia in A v A [2004] EWHC 142. At the same time, this solution is 
compatible with the new paradigm of the binuclear family.   
21  Re  K [2008] EWCA Civ 526  
22  Re H [1995] 2 FLR 883 per Ward LJ at p. 889.  
23 Re N, unreported, Court of Appeal, 2nd September 1994; Re R [1995] 2 FLR 612. 
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Nevertheless, applications were generally refused in cases where parents were unable to 
communicate or co-parent effectively.24   
 
However, a reversal of this causal relationship between parental cooperation and the SRO 
began in D v D [2001].25  This case is regarded as having significantly changed the law by 
removing any “gloss” from the welfare principle that made this order more difficult to obtain.26  
D v D was decided on the basis of a near-equal division of the children’s time,27 but recognition 
of the children’s reality was only one of two stated objectives.  The second was for the parents 
to use this framework, and its symbolic connotations of equal status,28 to “go away and make 
contact work”.29   Subsequent cases continued to emphasise that a SRO must reflect practical 
realities, but, once this was established, judges were increasingly swayed by arguments about 
symbolic messages.30  In the high-conflict A v A [2004] the order was explicitly made to reduce 
animosity between the parents.31   The case has subsequently been cited as authority for the fact 
that shared residence was appropriate even in cases where parents were unable to talk to each 
other.32    Again, family law was being used to mask unsettling societal change by creating the 
appearance of the traditional nuclear family, headed by a father, continuing in a binuclear 
form across two households.  
 
Co-parenting, within the SRO framework, has been given a new, narrow legal meaning.  It is 
defined in negative, rather than positive, terms: one parent must not interfere with the other’s 
                                                     
24  A v A [1994] 1 FLR 669; Re WB [1995] 2 FLR 1023; H v H [1997] 1 FCR 603. 
25  D v D [2001] 1 FLR 495. 
26  Re S [2003] EWCA Civ 387, per Dame Butler-Sloss P. 
27  The father calculated that the children spent some 38% of their time with him.   
28  NB that parents already have formal equality in terms of rights and duties if they both have PR.   
29 D v D [2001] 1 FLR 495, per Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss at p503 
30  Re C [2002] 1 FLR 1136; Re A [2002] EWCA Civ 1343. 
31 A v A [2004] EWHC 142 at [3].  
32  See e.g. Re R [2005] EWCA Civ 542; Re A [2008] EWCA Civ 867; Re R [2009] EWCA Civ 358.  
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exercise of PR in relation to day-to-day matters.33   This has ensured that the SRO, now 
perceived to be the solution to the problem of high-conflict families, could be available to 
greater numbers.  The law, according to Luhmann, “cannot allow a legal norm to lose its 
validity just because someone infringes it” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 296).  If parents have to learn to 
cooperate within these new dual-household post-separation families, then they should.  Law 
continued to seek to influence parents’ choices even in the face of their opposition; this 
suggests that the legal subsystem views itself as quite powerful (whether it actually is or not).   
 
At this stage, using the SRO to teach parents to cooperate was still seen as an added benefit to 
the requirement that the order must, as the draftsmen behind the Children Act had insisted, 
reflect practical realities.  By 2008, however, commentators observed that shared residence had 
developed “a special meaning” that was “far removed from the statute” (Spencer, 2008, p. 24).  
Moreover, it had departed from the child welfare science understanding of when the SRO 
could be ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for children.  Gilmore rightly expressed concern over the judicial 
tendency to refer only to other judgments and without engaging with research knowledge on 
how parental conflict is known to affect children (Gilmore, 2006, p. 497). A number of studies 
show that “conflict between parents that is frequent, intense and poorly resolved is particularly 
damaging” (Smith & Trinder, 2012, p. 431).     
 
Law, as subsystem, may be cognitively open, but it alone determines what will be considered.   
In Re A [2008] and Re R [2009] judges expressly declined to follow psychiatrists’ 
recommendations against shared residence, preferring instead to rely on the new, legal 
                                                     
33  A v A [2004] EWHC 142 per Wall LJ at [118]; Douglas, G (2006) “Residence: Re P (Shared Residence Order)” Family 
Law, 447.     
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definition from case authorities.34  This fits well with Luhmann’s claim that law asserts its 
power by deciding what it regards as relevant or irrelevant purely by reference to its internal 
criteria (1989, p. 141).      
 
As communications in judgments were linked to previous communications, this new 
understanding of the SRO was strengthened.  While the original understanding of the SRO 
was occasionally re-asserted in judgments,35 these communications tended not to be repeated by 
other judges, and not to become part of the changing case law.   
 
In Re T [2009] Wall LJ described equal division as “rare”, suggesting that most cases now 
departed from what had previously been presumed to be the standard shared residence 
arrangement of 50/50 sharing.36  In Re W [2009] Wilson LJ quoted Sir Mark Potter P in Re A 
[2008]: “It is now recognised by the court that a shared residence order may be regarded as 
appropriate where it provides legal confirmation of the factual reality of a child’s life or where, 
in a case where one party has the primary care of a child, it may be psychologically beneficial to 
the parents in emphasising the equality of their position and responsibilities.”37   The two 
purposes identified in D v D [2001] have been separated; in the quote they are linked with 
“or”, rather than “and”.  Elucidating further, Wilson LJ identified recalcitrant primary carers 
(usually mothers) as the target group for this new use of the SRO.38  In other cases, SROs were 
                                                     
34  In Re R [2009] EWCA Civ 358 Wall LJ stated at [30] that the SRO under s.8 “is a legal, not a psychiatric concept”; 
Re A [2008] EWCA Civ 867 per Adam J at [58]. 
35  Ward LJ, who continued to insist this was an essentially practical order, was prompted to observe in Re G [2008] 
EWCA Civ 1468 at para 17: “A residence order gives the mother no added right over and above the father.  That 
is the lesson that has not yet been fully learned in the 19 years that the Act has been on the statute book”. 
36  Re T [2009] EWCA Civ 20 at [35].  
37  Re W [2009] EWCA Civ 370 at [11]. 
38  Re W [2009] EWCA Civ 370 at [15].  
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made despite decidedly unequal allocations of time and considerable geographical distances 
between the parents. 39  
 
As Collier and Sheldon have argued, family law’s current focus on ensuring fathers’ continued 
attachment to their children through a dual-household family must be linked to “wider policy 
agendas”. (Collier & Sheldon, 2008, p. 218).  Modern fatherhood is constructed within both 
the political and legal subsystems as a “problem” to be “managed” by law” (ibid, p. 176). This 
view has been strengthened as fathers’ rights organisations continue to express their frustration 
at family law’s perceived bias and toothlessness, and individual fathers demand shared 
residence as the only way to obtain equal status (Spencer, 2008, p. 24).   Furthermore, law’s 
conservative normative framework and view of itself as existing to stabilise society also made it 
comparatively easy for it to internally reconstruct campaigners’ doom-mongering linking of 
fatherlessness, delinquency, and social disintegration (see e.g. Geldof, 2003, p. 182).  As a 
result of these perceived pressures, the predominantly or exclusively symbolic use of the order 
came to be accepted as commonplace by judges and others involved in the family courts.40   In 
Re A R, Mostyn J, said the SRO “is nowadays the rule rather than the exception even where the 
quantum of care undertaken by each parent is decidedly unequal”.41  
 
8 Why Parents Reject Family Law’s Normative Pronouncements  
 
                                                     
39  D v S [2008] EWHC 363; CC v PC [2006] EWHC 1794; Re N [2006] EWCA Civ 872 
40  For example, in Re A [2008], an application by a step-father, the Cafcass reporter observed:  “Had Mr A been H's 
biological father, it would have been reasonable for the Court to order shared residence, as a reflection of the equal 
status and the responsibilities of the mother and Mr A”.  Re A [2008] EWCA Civ 867 at [49].   
41  Re A R (Children) [2010] EWHC 1346 at para.52.  
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However, the combination of the strong pro-contact stance, the use of PR to encourage 
paternal involvement and the redefinition of the SRO as a panacea for high conflict families 
failed to ‘solve’ the problems of separated parenthood.  Dissatisfaction with family law has 
remained.  From an autopoietic perspective, it is well known that changes sought by one system 
are rarely straightforwardly achieved in the other.   The second system will not respond as 
required, as it “obeys a different internal logic” (Teubner, 1998, p. 22).  Power includes the 
power to obstruct (Luhmann, 1979, p. 163). These statements apply not only to the 
interference between the legal and political subsystems, but also to law’s attempts to modify the 
behaviour of separated parents.   
 
Research shows that just as it is only rational within the financial subsystem to obey the law if 
this results in a profit, parents in contact and residence cases perform similar cost/benefit 
analyses.  They feel justified in disobeying legal pronouncements where these conflict with their 
internal moral codes (Laing, 2006; Kaganas, & Day Sclater, 2004).  When interviewed, 
mothers linked resistance to contact to their duty to protect their children from the risks posed 
by dangerous, incompetent or unreliable fathers, while non-resident fathers saw continuing, 
stressful court battles for contact as the only way to prove their love for their children. The 
other parent was always blamed for litigation.  It is too costly for parents to abandon self-
descriptions that classify them as good and committed parents; instead the new information 
from law is recreated so as to suggest that these parents are legitimate exceptions to the general 
rules (Laing, 2006; Kaganas, & Day Sclater, 2004).  Thus, they see the comparatively powerful 
legal system as directing and limiting, but not dictating, their choices.   
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Furthermore, law, as a subsystem, does not ‘see’ the individuals who appear before it, but 
instead its own, internally recreated versions (Teubner et al, 2003, p. 915), a set of simplified 
semantic artefacts including the vulnerable child, the supportive or implacably hostile mother 
and the sincere or dangerous father who are described in case reports. Research has found a 
gap between family law’s abstract norms based on ordinary, responsible parents, and the real 
cases where the families were more often than not struggling with unemployment, poverty, 
addiction, physical or mental ill health. Often the right questions were never asked.  For the 
adults and children, this resulted in wasted efforts, repeated disappointments, and a sense of 
powerlessness (Rejmer, 2003, pp. 73-76; Ekbom & Landberg, 2007, pp. 34-35).   
 
In England and Wales, Smith and Trinder evaluated the latest initiative designed for 
embittered parents: the Separated Parents’ Information Programme (PIP).  They drew on 
autopoietic theory to observe that, ironically, PIP is promoted as an alternative to ineffective 
courts, yet it fails to achieve its objectives largely because it is adopting the legal subsystem’s 
narrower understandings of conflict resolution as well as its patriarchal, simplistic and 
generalised view of contact as best for children (Smith & Trinder, 2012).  The narrow legal 
focus on resolving the stalemate, and the mismatch between the one-size-fits-all PIP and these 
families’ complex needs meant that PIP could “make contact happen” but could not “make 
contact work” in the longer term (ibid, pp. 436-438).   Law is sufficiently powerful to enslave 
mediation discourse, but not to streamline parents’ decision-making into the ‘good’ divorce 
path. There is, moreover, a group of protracted contact disputes where older children’s refusals 
make direct contact impossible (Harding & Newnham, 2014, p. 674).  It is clear that power is 
not a simple matter of unidirectional cause and effect.  
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In relation to shared residence case law, several judges in the Court of Appeal are now 
advancing a more pragmatic and child-focused understanding of what SROs can achieve.  
These communications are now repeated in subsequent judgments, allowing Black LJ to 
observe in Re E [2011] that the law “has moved on” since Mostyn J advocated using the SRO as 
standard.42  This is due to an emphasis on the fact that in high conflict cases, shared residence 
can be “a recipe for disaster”.43  The previous understanding of SROs as having great symbolic 
value was advanced primarily by two Lords Justices of Appeal who no longer sit in that court, 
suggesting that while individuals, as closed psychic subsystems, cannot directly steer a social 
subsystem, they can have an impact on developments.  Actors must choose whether and how to 
communicate when participating in a discourse, but there remains a number of choices.  In 
this way, it can be said that individual judges are not completely powerless.  According to 
Luhmann, this is, indeed, how power works: it limits choices but does not eliminate choice 
completely (1979, p. 163).   
 
9 Reform, Again 
 
However, if the SRO is no longer the legal solution to the political problem of disaffected 
parenthood, another solution must be found.  Dissatisfaction with family law has continued, 
with allegations of inadequacy and bias being “found primarily in the assertions of disaffected 
fathers” (Kaganas, 2013, p. 283).   This group, as has been discussed above, has become adept 
at structuring communications in such a way as to maximise impact on the political and legal 
systems by linking their communications to conservative aspects of those subsystems.  
                                                     
42  Re E (Children) [2011] EWCA Civ 1017 per Black LJ at para. 14 citing what she had previously said in T v T [2010] 
EWCA Civ 1366. 
43  Re R [2012] EWCA Civ 1326 per Hughes LJ at para.9    
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Soundbites based on anecdotal evidence and simplistic constructions of equality have also had 
considerable impact on public opinion, or the general first-order social system that is society.44  
Thus, in 2014, the UK coalition government amended the Children Act 1989.   
 
Luhmann has commented on how more legislation is increasingly seen within both law and 
politics as the solution to problems.  As Kaganas has noted, the proposed reform makes the 
government seem like they are doing something to mend “Broken Britain” (2013, p. 290).   
However, since such “result orientation” will always, to a greater or lesser extent, fail to achieve 
all of its objectives, these disappointments “are fed back into the system” and more legislation 
is seen as the solution to correct the unintentional consequences: “legislation incites 
legislation” (Luhmann 1990, p. 240).   
 
The Children and Families Act 2014 contains a number of changes, two of which relate to 
shared parenting.  The first is the replacement of contact and residence with a new Child 
Arrangements Order, the aim of which is to remove the incentive for parents to fight over 
labels.45  In Re A R, Mostyn J praised the increased use of  SROs since “they avoid the 
psychological baggage of right, power and control that attends a sole residence order, which 
was the one of the reasons that we were ridden of the notions of custody and care and control 
by the [Children] Act of 1989”.46  The only observation to be made in response to this is that if 
avoiding psychological baggage did not work after the 1989 Act, why should it work now?   
                                                     
44  In a recent Ministry of Justice survey only half of interviewees felt very or fairly confident that the Family Courts 
listen to both parents and make decisions that are in children’s best interests.  R Franklyn, ‘Analytical Summary: 
Public attitudes to Civil and Family Court Fees’, 2013, Ministry of Justice. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/262917/public-attitudes-civil-
family-court-fees.pdf  (last accessed 11th December 2013).   
45  The Children and Families Act 2014, Section 12; Ministry of Justice and Department for Education (2012) The 
Government Response to the Family Justice Review: A system with children and families at its heart, TSO, p. 69.  
46  Re A R (Children) [2010] EWHC 1346 (Fam) per Mostyn J at para.52.   
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The other change, Section 11, has been more controversial.  There are two points to be made 
about this amendment.  Firstly, its title was changed from “Shared Parenting” to “Parental 
Involvement”.  This, and other amendments, were made to ensure that the section should not 
be misunderstood as a presumption in favour of equal sharing.47   This is because the 
Government has taken note of Australian research, which found that law reform with a shared 
parenting presumption put children at risk of harm where unsuitable fathers insisted upon, 
and were given, their perceived rights by mothers who felt opposition would be futile.   
Nevertheless, practitioners and academics have expressed fears that the reform will still be 
misunderstood this way by parents in England and Wales (Fehlberg, 2012).  Autopoietic theory 
asserts that when a system recreates external information through re-entry, it will tend towards 
the interpretation that is most compatible with its existing normative and cognitive framework.  
Although the system is usually unaware of this process and therefore does not perceive itself to 
be powerful, an observer could see alter’s power to frustrate ego’s intentions as a counter-flow of 
power.  In relation to abusive parents who see themselves as having more power to insist on 
their perceived rights this will have real detrimental effects for children who are left with an 
aggressive or otherwise dangerous parent, and for primary carer parents who feel powerless to 
intervene.    
 
                                                     
47  Baroness Butler-Sloss’ proposed amendment was accepted by both the House of Lords and the House of 
Commons on the understanding that it would signal more clearly that this was not about “a right to a certain 
amount of time with a child”:  Edward Timpson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Education, Hansard, 
HC Deb  vol 575 col 636 (10th February 2014) [Electronic version].  
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The second point to be made is that the Government has explicitly acknowledged that the 
reform should not change how courts decide disputes.48  Instead, the aim is to send symbolic 
messages that alter public perceptions that educate both parents and the general public.   
 
A further observation on the patriarchal nature of law (and politics) and these systems’ 
susceptibility to fathers’ rights’ based turbulence can be made here. The government’s stated 
aims of the 2014 reform were “to restore public confidence in the family justice system by 
eliminating perceptions of bias, while at the same time keeping parents out of court.” (Kaganas, 
2013, pp. 282-283).  This seems illogical: greater confidence in something usually results in 
greater use.  This logic only makes sense if we assume it to be underpinned by a view of 
mothers as a group of women who perceive themselves to be powerful, and therefore use the 
courts to maliciously frustrate fathers’ efforts. The aim is perhaps to redistribute power; but 
since it is based on one, partial and largely erroneous perception of power relationships, it is 
flawed.49      
 
According to the Minister for Children and Families, “The most important element of this is 
to ensure that there is real confidence in the family justice system.”50   Kaganas has rightly 
criticised this emphasis on law’s educative power, given “the failure of the law in the past to 
influence individual parents’ behaviour” (Kaganas, 2013, p. 280).  
                                                     
48  Department for Education, Children and Families Bill 2013: Contextual Information and Responses to Pre-Legislative 
Scrutiny, Cm 8540 (TSO, 2013), at para 63, Annex 1 of Annex B. 
https://www.education.gov.uk/publications/eOrderingDownload/ 
Children%20and%20Families%20Bill%202013.pdf (last accessed 11 August 2013). 
49  It is not denied that there are a small number of parents who needlessly frustrate contact; but they are a small 
minority (Harding & Newnham, 2014, p. 675). They are also, ironically, the least likely to listen to ‘lectures’ from 
law; the costs to the individual autopoietic system of abandoning the self-description of a good, selfless parent that 
is fighting the case for the child’s sake are too high.   
50  Edward Timpson’s evidence before the Justice Committee: Justice Committee, Fourth Report: Pre-Legislative Scrutiny 
of the Children and Families Bill (TSO, 2012) para 149. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmjust/739/73907.htm#a10 (last accessed 11 
August 2013). 
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Autopoietic theory is helpful in relation to both these points; it explains why the reform is 
unlikely to improve interparental cooperation but may lead to an increased use of shared 
residence in families where it does not benefit the children.   
 
Messages are very imperfectly ‘translated’ (in reality recreated) within the receptor system, what 
will be rejected or accepted depends on the latter’s existing normative and cognitive 
framework: what the system or person can understand and process and what they want to hear. 
Parents who already want their equal rights are likely to misunderstand new legislation this 
way, and if the other parent sees themselves as comparatively powerless, they will allow their 
choice to be limited to accepting such demands, possibly because they feel resistance is 
pointless (Fehlberg, 2012).  Other parents may choose, for reasons which are perfectly valid to 
them, to ignore this reform altogether, or to hijack the legal welfare discourse to suit their own 
ends.  Parents may be perceived to have less power, when confronted with the legal system, but 
they are not powerless, and their role as voters in the political system leads to a suggestion that 
perhaps power, like communications, flows through circular chains.  This examination of the 
changing law on shared parenting has confirmed Luhmann’s observations of power as largely 
about perceptions of choice, but also as multidimensional and multidirectional (1979, p. 163).  
  
34 
 
 
10 Bibliography  
 
Bailey-Harris, Rebecca, Barron, J and Pearce, J (1999) “From Utility to Rights? The 
Presumption of Contact in Practice”, International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 
13: 111-131.  
Barnett, Adrienne (2009) ‘The Welfare of the Child Re-Visited: In Whose Best Interests? Part 
II’, Family Law: 135-141.  
Clarkson, Hugh and Dale Clarkson (2007) “Confusion and Controversy in Parental 
Alienation”, JSWFL 29: 265-275.  
Collier, Richard and Sally Sheldon (2008) Fragmenting Fatherhood: A Socio-Legal Study, Oxford, 
Hart Publishing.  
Department of Health (1991) The Children Act 1989: Guidance and Regulations Vol 1, London, 
HMSO. 
DuBois, Ellen, Mary Dunlap, Carol Gilligan, Catherine MacKinnon, and Carrie Menkel-
Meadow (1985) “Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the Law - A Conversation”, 
Buffalo Law Review 34, 11-88 
Ekbom, Inger and Åsa Landberg (2007) Innerst Inne var man Rädd, Stockholm, Rädda Barnen & 
Socialstyrelsen. 
Fehlberg, Belinda (2012) “Legislating for Shared Parenting: How the Family Justice Review got 
it Right”, Family Law: 709-713.  
Geldof, Bob (2003) ‘The Real Love that Dare Not Speak its Name: A Sometimes Coherent 
Rant’ in Andrew Bainham, Bridget Lindley, Martin Richards and Liz Trinder (eds) 
Children and their Families: Contact, Rights and Welfare, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 171-
200. 
Gilmore, Stephen (2006) ‘Court Decision-making in Shared Residence Order Cases: A Critical 
Examination’, Child and Family Law Quarterly 18: 478-498. 
Gilmore, Stephen (2008) ‘The Assumption that Contact is Beneficial: Challenging the “Secure 
Foundation”’, Family Law: 1226-1229. 
Harding, Maebh and Annika Newnham, A (2014) ‘Initial research findings: the typical levels of 
parental involvement where post-separation parenting is resolved by court order’, Family 
Law, 672-675. 
Harris, Peter and Rob George (2010) ‘Parental Responsibility and Shared Residence Orders: 
Parliamentary Intentions and Judicial Interpretations’, Child and Family Law Quarterly 
22: 151-171. 
James, Adrian, James, Allison and Sally McNamee (2004) ‘Turning Down the Volume – Not 
Hearing Children in Family Proceedings’, Child and Family Law Quarterly 16: 189-202. 
35 
 
Kaganas, Felicity and Shelley Day Sclater (2004) ‘Contact Disputes: Narrative Constructions of 
“Good” Parents’, Feminist Legal Studies: 1-27. 
Kaganas, Felicity and Christine Piper (2002) ‘Shared Parenting – a 70% Solution?’, Child and 
Family Law Quarterly 14: 365-379. 
Kaganas, Felicity (2013) ‘A presumption that ‘involvement’ of both parents is best: deciphering 
law’s messages’ Child and Family Law Quarterly: 270-293. 
King, Michael & Christine Piper (1995) How the Law Thinks About Children (2nd Ed), Aldershot, 
Arena.  
Laing, Karen (2006) ‘Doing the Right Thing: Cohabiting Parents, Separation and Child 
Contact’, International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family: 169-179.  
Law Commission (1988) Family Law Review of Guardianship and Custody, No 172, London, 
HMSO.  
Lawler, Stephanie (1999) ‘Children Need but Mothers only Want: the Power of Needs Talk in 
the Constitution of Childhood’, in Julie Seymour and Paul Bagguley (eds) Relating 
Intimacies: Power and Resistance, Basingstoke, Macmillan Press Ltd, 64-88. 
Luhmann , Niklas (1979), Power, Chichester, Wiley.   
Luhmann, Niklas (1989) ‘Law as a Social System’, Northwestern University Law Review 83: 136-
150. 
Luhmann , Niklas (1990) Essays on Self-Reference, Columbia University Press.   
Luhmann, Niklas (1992) ‘Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: the Differentiation of 
the Legal System’, Cardozo Law Review 13: 1419-1441. 
Luhmann, Niklas (1995) ‘Legal Argumentation: An Analysis of its Form’, Modern Law Review 
58: 285-298.   
Murray, Charles (1996) “The Emerging British Underclass” in Ruth Lister (Ed) Charles Murray 
and the Underclass: the Developing Debate, London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 27-53. 
Nobles, Richard and David Schiff (2009) ‘Why to Judges Talk the Way They Do?’ International 
Journal of Law in Context 5: 25-49. 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Andreas (2003) “Beauty and the Beast: Art and Law in the Hall 
of Mirrors”, Entertainment Law Review 2: 1- 34. 
Reece, Helen (2009) ‘The Degradation of Parental Responsibility’ in Rebecca Probert, Stephen 
Gilmore and Johnathan Herring (eds) Responsible Parents and Parental Responsibility, 
Oxford, Hart Publishing, 85-102.  
Rifkin, Janet (1980) “Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy”, Harvard Women’s Law Journal 3, 
83-95. 
36 
 
Roche, Jeremy (1991) ‘The Children Act 1989: Once a Parent Always a Parent’, Journal of Social 
Welfare and Family Law 13: 345-361. 
Ryder, Ernest (2008) ‘A Tale of Two Thresholds’, Family Law: 29-37. 
Ryrstedt, Eva (2009) “Samarbetssamtal” Svensk JuristTidning, 821-842.  
Silva, Elizabeth and Carol Smart, C (1999) ‘Introduction’ in E Silva & C Smart (eds) The New 
Family?, London, Sage Publications.  
Smart, Carol (1995) “Losing the Struggle for Another Voice: the Case of Family Law”, 
Dalhousie Law Journal, 173-195. 
Smith, Carole (2004) ‘Autopoietic Law and the ‘Epistemic Trap’: A Case Study of Adoption 
and Contact’, Journal of Law and Society 31: 318-44. 
Smith, Leanne and Liz Trinder (2012) ‘Mind the Gap: Parent Education Programmes and the 
Family Justice System’, Child and Family Law Quarterly: 428-451.  
Spencer, S (2008) ‘Benchmarks: Family Residence’, Law Society Gazette 39: 24-27.  
Teubner, Gunther (1993) Law as an Autopoietic System, London, Blackwell. 
Teubner, Gunther (1998) ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British law or How Unifying Law 
Ends up in New Divergences’, Modern Law Review 61: 11-32. 
Teubner, Gunther (2001) ‘Alienating Justice: On the Surplus Value of the Twelfth Camel’, in  
David Nelken and Jiří Přibáň, (eds) Law’s New Boundaries: Consequences of Legal 
Autopoiesis, Aldershot, Ashgate, 21-44. 
Teubner, Gunther, David Schiff and Richard Nobles (2003) ‘The Autonomy of Law: 
Introduction to Legal Autopoiesis’, in David Schiff and Richard Nobles (eds) 
Jurisprudence, London, Butterworths, 897-954. 
Trinder, Liz, ‘Shared Residence: A Review of Recent Research Evidence’, Child and Family Law 
Quarterly 2010: 475-498.    
van Krieken, Robert (2005) ‘The Best Interests of the Child and Parental Separation: On the 
Civilizing of Parents’, Modern Law Review 68: 25-48.  
van Krieken, Robert (2006) ‘Law’s Autonomy in action: Anthropology and History in 
Court’, Social & Legal Studies 15(4), 577-593. 
 
 
